Military Situation

"[W]hen I arrived in the Karen area I behaved as a Burmese soldier. Now I was the one who was bad." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Karen Private from SPDC Infantry Battalion #xx, who deserted in Papun District (Interview #225, 3/00)

The SPDC

"The LIB's [Light Infantry Battalions] and IB's [Infantry Battalions] operate for three months at a time and then they rotate to another place. In 2000 they were operating in the Baw Kyo Draw [Baw Kyo Valley], and to the west of the car road from Papun to Ka Ma Maung. They abuse and force the villagers to work until the villagers don't have time to do their own work. The villagers are also unable to give food to the KNU soldiers. The plan of the SPDC is for the KNU to disappear. In this plan, they don't fight the KNU themselves. They fight the villagers, women and widows. [The SPDC says] If they don't restrict the villagers, the KNU soldiers will shoot them very often and they can't endure that. For the same reason, if KNU soldiers shoot and one of them is wounded, they will kill ten villagers. If they don't do that it will not be easy for them to travel [they will be ambushed]. If one of the SPDC soldiers dies, they will kill at least ten villagers." - field report from KHRG field researcher (Field Report #16, 7/00)

While Papun town has been under Rangoon government control since 1955, the Burmese military has never had a strong permanent presence in the hills of Papun District and eastern Nyaunglebin District. Currently the SPDC can only claim to control the Sittaung River plains and the lower Bilin and Yunzalin river valleys, and even this is not absolute. Prior to 1996, Burmese military units mounted dry season offensives into the hills but were forced to retreat with the onset of the rains due to lack of supplies and the extreme difficulty of movement in the rain-soaked hills. The last few years have seen a change in that strategy. Roads have been pushed into the hills and camps set up along them. Once the roads and camps have been set up, supplies are trucked up the roads as far as possible, from where they are portered up to the smaller camps in the hills to be stockpiled there so the units stationed there can operate all year long. The roads are only passable in the dry season, so porters are used to carry the supplies the rest of the year. Another more recent aspect of this change in strategy is that the Burmese Army no longer just moves through an area destroying villages and fields, they now move into the area, establish their camps, bring supplies up and mount sweeps out of the camps to round up any villagers who have fled. To supply these new camps new roads are built. Often fenced, with wide killing grounds cleared on either side, protected by landmines and patrolled by troops, these roads are a formidable obstacle to fleeing villagers who need to cross them, and also constrict the movements of KNLA forces. Very little of the Burmese Army's efforts are aimed at seeking out the KNLA and engaging it. Most of the Army's operations are aimed at destroying the KNU's civilian support by hunting down the villagers who still live outside SPDC control, relocating villages not within easy reach, and stamping its authority on those villages which are already under its direct control.

"If we compare the past to the present, there are more and more problems now. There is so much oppression, because now they patrol in both the dry and the rainy season. We still have some people in hiding there, and I think their heads will turn this way, too [they will come here]. They do not have enough food to eat and the conditions are very bad. They don't have any medicines either. We've had to stay like that for many years already, moving around until all of our belongings are gone. All the things our grandparents gave us are gone, and when those are gone we can do nothing. Our animals have all been shot and killed by the Burmese. Our legs and arms are bound." - "Saw Lay Pa" (M, 39), refugee from xxxx village, Kyauk Kyi township (Interview #66, 1/00)

"They have come near us, but right now they have a new plan. In the past, they came up and destroyed everything and went back. Now, they come and after destroying things like rice and paddy, they plant landmines. They have planted a lot of landmines in this area. Many of our villagers have already stepped on them. In the future it will not be easy to stay here." - "Saw Maw Htoo" (M, 31), internally displaced villager from xxxx village, Shwegyin township (Interview #71, 2/00)

"The enemy is operating always. They come up and operate, then go back to rest and rotate their units. They are always rotating. When the enemy goes back [to their camp] they get their rations and rest then come up and operate. The people [KNU/KNLA] got an intercept [from the radio] that they [the SPDC] are going to clear the west side of the Bu Loh Kloh [of all Karen villagers; Bu Loh Kloh is the Bilin River]. They are going to clear the area step by step. They will do it until the villagers and soldiers [KNLA] can't stay there anymore and then they [the SPDC soldiers] will come to stay. They have already come to stay in one or two places. They have already established their Byu Ha [Operations Command headquarters] at Ka Baw Tu." - "Saw Lin Yone" (M, 32), KHRG field researcher from Nyaunglebin District (Interview #2, 2/01)

"In the resistance areas they were going into the jungle. When they were moving, they saw paddy barns. They [the officers] didn't know that they belonged to civilians [the paddy barns all belong to civilians]. The officers said they were the paddy barns of the Nga Pway [Ringworm, i.e. KNLA], then they burned them. When they saw the paddy barns they burned them. They ate what they could and what they could not eat they burned. Sometimes when they saw villagers in the jungle area far from the [SPDC] area of control, they shot them dead. When they saw villagers in the areas that they controlled they called them Nyein Chan Yay ['Peace' villagers]. In the place where they shot people dead, they didn't let anything happen. When they saw villages, they burned them down. When they saw the people, they killed them. They said that those people were giving them the chance to kill them [by remaining in the area, the villagers are inviting the soldiers to shoot them]. I have seen this." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #xx, Papun District (Interview #226, 11/00)

"They stay at 2 or 3 places close to us. They stay at D---, D---, D--- and T---. They are making camps one by one." - "Saw Thay Doh" (M, 28), internally displaced villager from xxxx village, Shwegyin township (Interview #81, 3/00)

More than 50 SPDC Battalions have been sent into the region to carry out these operations (see Appendix E). SPDC battalions normally have a fighting strength of between 250 and 500 men. Though many of these battalions only have one or two Companies assigned to the region, the total number of SPDC troops is at least 10,000 to 15,000. Currently, up to 13 battalions of the Southern Regional Command and four battalions of the Southeastern Command are stationed in the area (these are two of Burma's 12 Regional Commands). Battalions and Companies usually rotate in and out of the frontline areas every three to four months from base camps further west in firmly SPDC-controlled areas. A few units such as Infantry Battalion (IB) #19 and Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) #340, 341 and 434 of the Southeastern Regional Command are permanently stationed in the area. In addition to these units, since January 2001 units of the Southwestern Regional Command (normally based in the Irrawaddy Division), Military Operations Commands [abbreviated as Sa Ka Ka ] #10 and #1 and Light Infantry Divisions [LIDs] #44, 66 and 77 have been operating in the area. The Sa Ka Ka's and LID's each have 10 battalions divided among three Tactical Operations Command headquarters. These units do not come under the regional commands and are brought in from their bases elsewhere in Burma for offensive operations. Since 1997, Sa Ka Ka's #3, 4, 6 and 12 and LID #11 have operated in the area for periods of time [see Appendix E for a more complete list of SPDC military units in the area]. These units do not rotate their battalions but are usually moved into an area until the operation is finished. Some of the battalions have been in the area for eight months or more [for more detailed information on the Burmese Army see also "Abuse Under Orders: The SPDC and DKBA Armies Through the Eyes of Their Soldiers" (KHRG #2001-01, 27-3-01)].

"The first battalions that came were LIB #308 and IB #36. They are from Bassein [in the Irrawaddy Division]. They are not the same as the battalions which have come up now, LIB #356 and #357. The Battalion Commander of LIB #356 is Nyunt Tin and the Deputy Battalion Commander is Thu Rain. The name of the LIB #357 Battalion Commander is Zaw Win Aung."- "Saw Ra Doh" (M, 35), villager from xxxx village, Dweh Loh township (Interview #199, 6/00)

"Battalions #547, 356, 231 and 548 [all LIB's except #231 which is an IB] arrived in 2000. Now, Division #44 [Light Infantry Division] has come up. In the 2000 dry season it was [IB] #36 which stayed along the main road and in T--- camp. Later, LIB #308 came up and replaced #36. There were so many commanders that I can't remember them all." - "Mya Aung" (M, 32), village headman from xxxx village, Dweh Loh township (Interview #202, 6/00)

"The people call that unit #366, Kalay Myo Tactical Operations Command #10 [LIB #366 of Sa Ka Ka #10 from Kalay town in Northwestern Burma]." - "Saw Maw Ku" (M, 48), section leader from xxxx village, Dweh Loh township (Interview #155, 12/00)

"Their Byu Ha [Operations Command] stays with [LIB] #340. It is close to #341. There are four battalions in this area, the Papun area. They are #19, #341, #340 and #434." - "Saw Lu Lu" (M, 54), village head from xxxx village, Bu Tho township (Interview #224, 5/01)

"Right now Division [LID] #77 is operating there but I don't know which LIB's or IB's. Division #77 is staying below Meh Way and Division #66 is staying above Meh Way." - "Saw Eh Doh" (M, 25), KHRG field researcher from Papun District (Interview #3, 2/01)

"At present, the Burmese #366 has come up from Pyu. It is an IB [it is actually an LIB; Light Infantry Battalion] from Sa Ka Ka #10. They wrote 'No. 1 Tactical Operations Command' [on a sign] when they settled down at Wa Mu camp. The name of their operations commander is Kyaw Zin Oo. Wa Mu camp is to the west of the river [Bilin River] and behind Wa Mu village. It is an hour and a half walk from Kwih T'Ma. It is a five mile walk and south of Kwih T'Ma. They have made their Tactical Operations Command headquarters there and there are about 50 soldiers. Those 50 soldiers stay in the camp and another about 25 or 26 soldiers came up and are operating around Poh Kheh Hta, Nya Hsa Ghaw Hta, Kwih T'Ma, Ma Lay Ler and Kay Kaw. The whole division came up. In October their unit settled down in Doh Koh Wah for a while. In the past they changed the soldiers every six months, but now the unit there has been there for eight months and they haven't been changed yet." - "Saw Maung Sein" (M, 40), KHRG field researcher from Papun District (Interview #4, 2/01)

Life Within an Army Camp

Army life for the common soldiers in the camps is anything but easy. Many of the soldiers never wanted to be in the Army and were either tricked or forced to join, others volunteered. After four months training, in which the soldiers are beaten and forced to labour for their trainers, the privates are sent to a frontline battalion.

At the frontline they are cut off from any communication with their families or friends back home, as well as any news from the radio or newspapers. The officers deduct money out of their salaries for items like their uniforms and boots as well as charity projects that do not exist, until there is very little left for the soldiers to use. The soldiers also have many of their rations stolen by the officers, who sell them for their own profit. They must then resort to stealing food from villagers, while the officers simply have to issue an order to receive pork or chicken from a village. Some soldiers are so ashamed of this that they try to steal villagers' livestock and rice at night, and many villagers relate how they can sometimes chase off a soldier by shouting even though the soldier has a gun.

Officers usually prefer to remain in their camps and make money. Going out on operations to hunt down the KNLA means the possibility of being injured or killed in an ambush or by stepping on a landmine. When they are forced to go out on an operation, they usually attack civilian villages instead because they are easier targets. Officers sometimes stage 'battles' by forcing civilians to wear soldier uniforms and then taking photos of the 'dead rebels', or demand guns or walkie-talkies from the villagers which they can report as being captured in combat. The privates are forced to fight what is only explained to them as 'the enemy', who shoots at them out of the forest and lays landmines for them to step on, and they are pushed to believe that this 'enemy' includes the villagers.

On a normal day in the camp, villagers on rotating shifts of forced labour are present to construct defensive works like trenches and bunkers, build barracks and fence the camp. The soldiers are ordered to oversee the villagers while they work. One or two people from each local village are kept around the camp for use as 'set tha' (messengers) by the officers to send written orders to the nearby village heads. Both villagers and soldiers are forced to be hand servants to the officers by cooking for them, washing their clothes and performing other menial tasks. The villagers at the camp are also forced to gather firewood and carry water, which is hard work because the camps are usually on hilltops. Village heads arrive during the day after being summoned to receive orders, or to supervise deliveries of food and materials which have been demanded by the officers. On a bad day, one or more village heads or villagers may be sitting locked in mediaeval-style bamboo leg stocks or locked in a pit in the ground, being punished for some failure to meet the officers' demands.

All of the extortion money and forced labour fees exacted from the villagers go into the hands of the officers who kick a portion of it upstairs to their superiors, while the privates receive nothing. Officers are always thinking of new ways to make money. Villagers are forced to work on farms and plantations for the officers, who take all the food for the Army or sell it and pocket the money. Orders are sent out to villages demanding thatch, logs, planks and bamboo, some of which is used to maintain the camp while the officers sell the rest for profit. The soldiers are also used as forced labour on the officers' personal projects, which usually include brick-baking and fishponds. For brick-baking the villagers are forced to bring cartloads of firewood, while the soldiers are forced to dig clay and bake the bricks all day. The officer then sells the bricks for 5 Kyat each for himself. After baking bricks all day the soldiers have to stand sentry at night, and if they get caught asleep they are usually beaten severely and tied up in the hot sun the following day.

The foot soldiers are sent out led by the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO's) on patrols or to carry supplies to outlying camps using villagers or convicts as porters. They are told they will be punished if they arrive late, and the fear of this drives them to push, kick and abuse the porters who they think are going too slowly. The soldiers are beaten by their officers and senior NCO's for any real or perceived mistakes, and any leniency shown to the villagers is met with scorn and even physical abuse from the officers. The officers and senior NCO's instill such a climate of fear in the private soldiers that they will do almost anything to avoid being punished. This includes torturing and killing villagers.

It does not take long before the privates find it hard to continue bearing the physical and other abuse they face. Many of them also realise that what is happening is wrong and that they are at the bottom of a system wherein they are forced to abuse the civilians for the profit of the officers. Morale in the Burmese Army has suffered correspondingly and is very poor. There are very few ways out. The soldiers are constantly warned that they will be brutally executed if they flee and are caught by the opposition. Suicides are not uncommon and the desertion rate is already high and getting higher.

Despite this large number of soldiers, equivalent to the number of units involved in the large-scale military offensives against Manerplaw in 1995 and Dooplaya in 1997, there has been no major military operation directed against the KNLA. The patrols and sweeps conducted by the soldiers have been directed primarily at the civilians, to remove any possibility of support for the KNU by entirely depopulating the region. Karen villagers have become so impoverished that most villages are able to give little or no support to the KNLA besides intelligence. A basic analysis of the area by military intelligence would tell the Burmese Army this, yet the villages are still wiped out. SPDC units rarely actively seek out and engage KNLA units. Most of the operations are geared towards seeking out villagers hiding in the forests or in villages which the SPDC does not control and killing or capturing them, destroying their fields and hidden food caches and looting their property. There have even been several instances of SPDC officers faking engagements with the KNLA and falsifying reports to their superiors. Villagers have told KHRG of being forced to put on uniforms, lay on the ground, have blood poured on them and then be photographed as a 'dead' KNLA soldier. A more common occurrence is the demanding of weapons and walkie-talkies from villagers, which are then reported as being captured in combat. Both the photographs and the weapons or walkie-talkies are used by the officers to prove to their superiors their skill in battle and hopefully gain themselves a promotion or other reward. In areas under SPDC control the Army spends quite a bit of effort on money making projects. This usually involves civilian labour with the profits going to the officers. However, morale among the rank and file in the Burmese Army is very low and desertion is becoming increasingly common.

"They are staying there but LIB #369 went back to operate around Thay Koh Hser Der. They came to stay for a month then went back. Right now LIB #365 and LIB #367 still remain. LIB #365 is active at the frontline [doing the patrolling and fighting] and LIB #367 is sending the food. They go back and get it from Koh Sghaw and send it to Yoh Po Loh. They are stockpiling their food in one place. ... They have set up their camps at Saw Hta, Thee Mu Hta, Kyauk Nyat, Oo Dah Hta, Meh Ka Hta, Oo Thu Hta, Thaw Leh Hta but I don't know about south of Thaw Leh Hta. There is also one at Manerplaw." - "Saw Eh Doh" (M, 25), KHRG field researcher from Papun District (Interview #3, 2/01)

"They took two villagers from xxxx [village] but I didn't ask their names. They had to guide the soldiers. After they took the two villagers they were going to climb Kler Wa Law Mountain, but they didn't dare to climb it so they shelled it with two big mortars. They wanted to go that way but they didn't dare to go so they shelled it. They were worried that the KNLA was there so they shelled the mountain." - "Htaw Say" (M, 43), villager from xxxx village, Dweh Loh township (Interview #210, 2/01)

Everywhere that SPDC units operate they use large numbers of civilian porters to haul their ammunition and supplies, and this is especially true in Papun and Nyaunglebin districts due to the lack of roads and the difficult terrain. Thousands of porters are being used in the present operations in the region. Many of these are taken from the SPDC-controlled villages in the two districts, but there are not enough people in these villages to supply all of their needs so they have also been rounding up young men in nearby areas of central Burma, including Pegu, Rangoon and the Irrawaddy Delta. Some of these men have told KHRG that troops surrounded tea shops or cinemas, doused the lights and loaded all the young men onto trucks for transport to the frontline, or that they were approached in a train station and offered work only to find themselves sold to the Army by a labour agent. To get even larger numbers, the SPDC has been bringing convicts from all over Burma to the frontlines as porters. Some are promised early release or reduced sentences for going as porters, others are simply forced to go, and there is evidence to suggest that some are innocent people arrested and convicted on false charges simply to provide the Army with more porters. The conditions for all porters are horrendous, but are especially bad for convict porters, with an extremely high death rate. Many of the civilian and convict porters flee because they fear that they will otherwise be held until they die. [For more on the use of convicts as porters see the report "Convict Porters" (KHRG #2000-06, 20/12/00)].

The Sa Thon Lon

"[W]e dare not go back to our village because the Baw Bi Doh [Short Pants] are always wandering there. When they see anyone they don't like they kill them, even if they have letters of recommendation with them." - "Saw Plaw Doh" (M, 25), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #7, 2/00)

The Sa Thon Lon Dam Byan Byaut Kya [Sa Thon Lon Guerrilla Retaliation] units began appearing in the villages in the Sittaung River plains of Nyaunglebin District in September 1998 and quickly established a reputation for brutality. 'Sa Thon Lon', or 'Three S's' in English, is the Burmese abbreviation for the Bureau of Special Investigations which is one of the bureaus of the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI). The Sa Thon Lon's original function was to crack down on the black market, but the Guerrilla Retaliation force has been nominally placed under it. The DDSI is controlled by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, Secretary-1 of the SPDC, and this may have been a move to place the Guerrilla Retaliation force under his control. The Sa Thon Lon units were originally created from the Non-Commissioned Officers of the battalions in the Southern Regional Command, but this command seems to have little operational authority over them. KNLA sources have said that the Sa Thon Lon reports directly to Military Intelligence Unit #3 in Toungoo and Burmese officers have told villagers that they have no control over what the Sa Thon Lon does. The total strength of the force is about 200 soldiers who operate in small groups of from five to ten soldiers. The groups were originally known by names like 'Moe Kyo' ('Lightning') and 'Nagah' ('Dragon'), but villagers now refer to them more by the names of their commanders, although these are usually aliases.

"They don't have any place that they settle down [a camp]. They are always moving. In each group there are 7, 8, or 9 soldiers. There are about 7 or 8 groups. Each group has a name, and most of them are from IB #264. Thra Mya Zaw Tint is one of those who comes. As far as I know, they come from Battalions #264, #57, #350, #349, #440, IB #60, and #351. They gather and collect the corporals and soldiers one by one from each battalion. They are gathered from all the battalions. The people who come to xxxx [village] are called Na Ga ['dragon'] troop." - "Saw Mu Wah" (M, 40), refugee from xxxx village, Kyauk Kyi township (Interview #9, 4/00)

"[T]he Baw Bi Doh are more cruel than the Army. The last time people were threshing paddy, they provided recommendations for us and each one cost 500 Kyat. If you didn't pay to get it, they would kill you if they met you." - "Saw Plaw Doh" (M, 25), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #7, 2/00)

"[A]fter they do bad things when you see them you become afraid. It is very horrible in our area, because the worst two [Baw Bi Doh] groups are in our area: the groups at xxxx and yyyy [villages]. They never wear any unit badges, they just wear whatever they want to wear." - "Saw Daniel" (M, 43), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #8, 2/00)

Originally they did not have fixed bases but were constantly on the move taking their food from the villagers. The soldiers do not wear uniforms but civilian clothing. Villagers have nicknamed them the Baw Bi Doh, which is Burmese for 'short pants', because of their preference for wearing the type of gym shorts which villagers commonly wear under their sarongs. Operationally they do not actively seek out the KNU and its soldiers in the KNLA but instead act as execution squads, killing those villagers who are known or suspected of being KNU or having helped the KNU. They have also targeted villagers who had been KNU in the past but had left years before. Many, particularly former village heads, have been killed simply because they had once portered supplies for a KNLA unit or provided rice, whether voluntarily or not, to KNLA units. Villagers arrested by the Sa Thon Lon are usually taken away from the villages and summarily executed in the forest. The Sa Thon Lon prefers to stab or slit the throats of their victims rather than shoot them. Some villagers have said that at least some of the Sa Thon Lon soldiers can speak Karen and have been known to sit under houses at night and listen in to the conversations of the villagers inside [for more on the creation and methods of the Sa Thon Lon see "Death Squads and Displacement: Systematic Executions, Village Destruction and the Flight of Villages in Nyaunglebin District" (KHRG #99-04, 24-5-99)].

"When they didn't see what they were searching for, they called the village head and demanded poultry. Sometimes they demand money in the village. At some villages they demand 4,000 or 5,000 Kyat. Some villages must give more than this. They had to pay a lot. The villagers paid them, but they dare not tell anybody because the guerrillas [Sa Thon Lon] said they would kill anybody who told. At each village they have to pay at least 3,000 to 4,000 Kyat. The whole village has to pay. The village head has to collect it. … They said that they would make the villagers stop contact with the KNU and then they would make it become a white area [an area firmly under SPDC control]. They spoke like that, but we only see them killing more and more. They have only that plan. Sometimes they call a meeting in the village. They say, 'You villagers will stay peacefully in the village, don't contact the KNU. If you contact them, we are going to kill you. When we know that you have contacted them, we are going to kill you. Even if you do not go to them but they come to you, we are still going to kill you.' They are threatening us like that." - "Saw Mu Wah" (M, 40), refugee from xxxx village, Kyauk Kyi township (Interview #9, 4/00)

"Around the area of our village now, the group that is oppressing people is the Baw Bi Doh [Short Pants]. They kill people without using guns. They just use daggers and knives, or if they want to beat you to death, they do it. They do not waste bullets to kill you." - "Saw Daniel" (M, 43), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #8, 2/00)

"There's a group in our village called the Baw Bi Doh ['Short Pants', i.e. Sa Thon Lon Dam Byan Byaut Kya], and they wander around and look everywhere in the village. Then for example, if Saw Thu hasn't paid his quota, they come and write down his name. Then they provide the list of names [to the regular SPDC unit], and if that person can't pay his quota they arrest him. That group [the Baw Bi Doh] do whatever they like. They have guns with them but they don't usually use them, instead they carry bared daggers around and they take them out and flash them at you. They go around in small groups, only about 5 of them at a time. They don't have a camp. They patrol, and when they arrive at a village they sleep there. The Baw Bi Doh are always staying around our village." - "Saw Plaw Doh" (M, 25), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #7, 2/00)

"Maybe they hate dogs because they want to steal things in the night, or for their security, we're not sure. But people realised that at night they were sneaking under people's houses to listen secretly. They can understand Karen though they are not Karen, so maybe they've learned the Karen language. They can speak Karen but not fluently, and they can understand most things. So after 6 o'clock in the evening we don't dare talk to each other about the persecution, because if we do and they hear it then you'll be finished. We can only talk about persecution in the daytime, when we can see all around us - at night we can only talk about our work." - "Saw Daniel" (M, 43), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #8, 2/00)

Information obtained through interviews with villagers and KHRG field researchers indicates that the activities of the Sa Thon Lon have decreased in 2000 and 2001. They still operate in the district as well as in Toungoo District, but they now stay in SPDC or DKBA bases and do not move about as much. The number of killings attributed to the Sa Thon Lon has also drastically decreased. A possible reason for the decrease in the level of activity and number of executions attributed to the Sa Thon Lon is that they have already killed everyone they were able to catch in 1998 and 1999. Many others, particularly former village heads, who feared that they may be included on the Sa Thon Lon's 'list' fled to the hills beyond their reach. The Sa Thon Lon is still active in making demands on villagers for money and other things. One KHRG researcher has received information that they may have moved to the west side of the Sittaung River to the area of the Rangoon-Mandalay road, the rail line from Nyaunglebin to Theh Za Lone, and the area from Nyaunglebin to Kyauk T'Ga. The KNU has not operated on the west side of the Sittaung River since the 1970's so it is unclear why the Sa Thon Lon would have shifted their focus to that side of the river.

"I don't go to the plains area and they stay in the plains area. Only the battalions [regular Army units] come and operate in the mountains. The Sa Thon Lon are active along the Sittaung River. I heard that they are going to stay on the other side of the river [the Sittaung River] in the area of the car road [RangoonMandalay road] and the rail line from Nyaunglebin to Theh Za Lone. They are going to stay there and kill all the people who are popular [people who are working with the KNU]. They are active and there are many villages between Kyauk T'Ga and Nyaunglebin. They look and the people they suspect they kill." - "Saw Lin Yone" (M, 32), KHRG field researcher from Nyaunglebin District (Interview #2, 2/01)

"The guerrillas [Baw Bi Doh] have come to the village occasionally. Last year they came and hit some civilians but we haven't heard of it this year." - "Saw Bo Lweh" (M, xx), villager from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #10, 4/01)

"They threaten villagers; they have guns but they just carry unsheathed daggers around in their hands. Everyone is afraid when they see the things that happen, and if people see them they dare not show themselves and go to hide. If they see people, they interrogate them and threaten them with daggers, so people fear them. When they interrogate people they beat and abuse them - but not like a human would beat another human, more like a human would beat an animal he is angry with, even though the villagers have done nothing wrong." - "Saw Daniel" (M, 43), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #8, 2/00)

The DKBA

"When I stayed with the DKBA I thought that it had no meaning for me. That's why I came up here. I saw that in the future it would not be easy for the DKBA. The SPDC is watching them and their situation. If they misstep, it will be difficult for them. A couple of years ago, the SPDC gave them priority [supported them strongly], but now they do not give priority to them. Some [DKBA troops] just have to follow the SPDC wherever they go. They don't feed them. They just call and order them to follow." - "Saw Po Kyu" (M, xx), Private from #xxx Brigade DKBA, Papun District (Interview #7, 12/99)

The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army split off from the KNLA in 1994 after internal disputes in the KNU. It immediately allied itself with the SLORC after being promised control of Karen State if it helped the Burmese Army to defeat the KNU. Most of the former KNLA soldiers later defected back to the KNLA or simply went home after the level of SLORC involvement in the DKBA became clear. The DKBA's founder, the monk U Thuzana, is now rarely at the DKBA headquarters of Myaing Gyi Ngu (known as Khaw Taw in Karen) on the south side of the Salween River in Pa'an District. The DKBA has never had a strong central command structure and most units operate as a law onto themselves. New soldiers are mostly recruited from the villages. Most of the DKBA's activities have lately been turning towards making money from checkpoints, forced labour projects, extortion, logging and possibly now also drug running. Relations between the SPDC and the DKBA have never been good, but it is a marriage of convenience for both sides as the SPDC uses them to fight the KNLA and the DKBA uses the SPDC's protection to make money and acquire military supplies.

The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army is not as strong in Papun District as it is to the south in Pa'an and Thaton Districts. For the most part it is confined to Bu Tho and Dweh Loh townships with a very small presence around Papun town in Lu Thaw township. Militarily the units in Papun and Nyaunglebin Districts are under the #777 DKBA Brigade but they are mostly small, local and disorganised with the exception of the Ka Hsaw Wah ['White Elephant'] Battalion which seems to issue the bulk of the DKBA written orders which KHRG has received from the area. Recruitment is mostly local and new recruits are promised pay and exemptions from forced labour for their families. The soldiers rarely receive their pay, many of the soldiers do not have uniforms, and their weapons are for the most part cast-offs from the Burmese Army.

Many of the villages of Bu Tho township and some of the villages in southern Dweh Loh township were forcibly relocated to the DKBA headquarters at Khaw Taw [Myaing Gyi Ngu in Burmese] during 1995. After 1996 the SLORC gradually discontinued supplying rations to the population in Khaw Taw and said it would henceforth only provide rations to the soldiers and families of DKBA members. For the next few years the villagers around Khaw Taw tried to exist by farming where they could on overcrowded land. Eventually the villagers from villages near Khaw Taw were granted permission to return and work their fields. In 2000, the DKBA has apparently looked the other way as most of the population of Khaw Taw has either returned to their villages in Bu Tho and Dweh Loh townships or gone to the refugee camps in Thailand. This has resulted in a repopulating of the area, but has also weakened DKBA control over a large number of people [for background information on Khaw Taw see "Abuse Under Orders: The SPDC and DKBA Armies Through the Eyes of Their Soldiers" (KHRG #2001-01, 27-3-01), "Uncertainty, Fear and Flight: The Current Human Rights Situation in Eastern Pa'an District" (KHRG #98-08, 18-11-98), "Inside the DKBA" (KHRG #96-14, 31-3-96) and "SLORC's Northern Karen Offensive" (KHRG #95-10, 29-3-95)].

"Many people went to stay at Khaw Taw [also known in Burmese as Myaing Gyi Ngu] when the DKBA started [in 1995]. … Now they don't like to stay there and they have come back. … It was this year, 2001. The villagers want to come back. They didn't want to stay in Khaw Taw, but they didn't dare come back. They were being threatened. The DKBA were threatening them and told them, 'If you go back the people there [the KNU/KNLA] will kill you.' Some people who had already gone back said that the people [KNU/KNLA] hadn't killed them. They were frightened of us. We [the KNU] told them, 'You can come back and stay.' One of the families recently came back [from Khaw Taw] because they could no longer find food and it wasn't easy to stay there." - "Saw Po Hla" (M, 43), KNU township official, Bu Tho Township (Interview #219, 2/01)

"In the beginning everybody who went to stay there received things, but in 1997 they [the DKBA] divided the people and those who worked got it [food and other things]. The people who take responsibility [the leadership] get it. The civilians have to work [for themselves] to eat. They have to find a way. Some people whose villages are close went back to work in their villages." - "Naw Si Yu Paw" (F, 37), villager from xxxx village, Pa'an District (Interview #208, 10/00); talking about the situation in Myaing Gyi Ngu.

"In the past the DKBA didn't allow us to stay here. They forced us to flee down from the mountains and go stay in other villages. We went down to stay in other places and only came back to stay here in the last three years." - "Naw Say Paw" (F, 46), village headwoman from xxxx village, Dweh Loh township (Interview #195, 6/00)

Nyaunglebin District has never had a strong DKBA presence and the soldiers here remained loyal to the KNU after the split. Recent years have seen the DKBA expand its presence in Kyauk Kyi and Mone townships. They maintain a headquarters at Klaw Maw in Kyauk Kyi township as well as camps at Shwe Dan and Kaw Tha Say in Kyauk Kyi township and at Kyun Bin Seik and Maw Lay in Mone township. It may have more to do with business than power, as one DKBA deserter who had spent some time in the area noted when interviewed by KHRG (see below). There is virtually no local support for the DKBA in the area and many of its soldiers and even the commander seem to have been brought in from other areas. Villagers have commented that the commander's accent is a Pa'an accent and not a local one. There is no love between the DKBA and the SPDC so it is difficult to see why the SPDC would allow this expansion. The DKBA soldiers, like the Sa Thon Lon, do not seem to operate in the hills to the east, but stay close to the plains.

"We were just there to sell the logs that their people sent to us. We had no other purpose. They come and get the logs from the mountains and then cut them in Myaing Gyi Ngu. Then they sell them wherever they can. For one tonne of teak they can get 60,000, sometimes 70,000 Kyat in Shwegyin. They just sell logs and do business. They also work in the cattle and buffalo black market. … They don't come to fight the KNU. They just do their economic business and if they meet with the KNU, they shoot. If they hear that people have helped or joined the KNU, they arrest them. Other than that, they just do their business. I think that they have no other aim." "Saw Po Kyu" (M, xx), Private from #xxx Brigade DKBA, Papun District (Interview #228, 12/99)

"Ko Per Baw [DKBA] is there. They stay in the plains area. They cannot come into the hills." - "Saw Ghay Hser" (M, 26), KHRG field researcher from Nyaunglebin District (Interview #1, 2/01)

"Only that the Ko Per Baw [DKBA] is active and making camps like at Shwe Dah. The Ko Per Baw stay in Shwe Dah and Thayet Chaung. It [Thayet Chaung] is between Shwe Dah and Kaw Tha Say. We call it Thayet Bin Maung Na Ma. It is on the car road. The Ko Per Baw stays in four places. The Burmese stay from Klaw Maw to Baw Ka Hta and the DKBA stay at Kaw Tha Say. The Burmese soldiers stay at Baw Ka Hta. They don't stay in Kaw Tha Say. The DKBA have stayed there for three years already. Klaw Maw is the Ko Per Baw headquarters [for the area]. A lot of them stay there at Klaw Maw Paya Gyi [Klaw Maw Pagoda]." - "Saw Lin Yone" (M, 32), KHRG field researcher from Nyaunglebin District (Interview #2, 2/01)

"Their commander is from Myaing Gyi Ngu [DKBA headquarters in Pa'an district], and his accent is lilting like people from Pa'an area." - "Saw Daniel" (M, 43), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #8, 2/00)

"The DKBA soldiers stay at Kaw Tha Say camp. It is beside the village, on the other side of the fence. There are about 10 soldiers from #777 Brigade, Battalion #1. They call their officer 'Gaung Gyi.'" - "Saw Mu Wah" (M, 40), refugee from xxxx village, Kyauk Kyi township (Interview #9, 4/00)

After the DKBA's connections to the SLORC became more apparent its initial popularity declined drastically. Most people would rather support the KNU if given the choice. The DKBA has become increasingly corrupt and more interested in business than in fighting the KNU. DKBA commanders are heavily involved in logging in Papun District and Nyaunglebin District. DKBA deserters have told KHRG that the wood is cut in these areas and processed to be sold in Myaing Gyi Ngu or Pa'an to whoever will buy it. The DKBA is also involved in the black market cattle and buffalo trade within Burma and to Thailand. DKBA deserters interviewed by KHRG have said that the DKBA regularly violates its four aims of "protecting the nationality, protecting the religion, obeying those in authority and retaining good morals in the populace." One deserter commented that DKBA members, especially the leadership, spent most of their time chasing women and trying to get rich. Another said that the families of the DKBA commanders were getting rich but the soldiers could barely feed their families.

"They have an understanding with us, and sometimes they say that we are all Karen and that they love the Karen people. They say that if anyone gets into trouble to go to their camp and they will take care of us. But after we go to them they tell us, 'Now that you have come to us, you have to believe in our beliefs', so not a lot of people go to them. We can get a little bit of protection from them, but we are Christians so we can't consider it [changing their beliefs to get protection]. If we need to run to someone, we would prefer to run to the Ko Per Thu ['Black Headbands' - KNLA commandos]. Some people who stay there [with the DKBA] have to do 'loh ah pay' [forced labour], but they don't have to pay porter fees and such things, so it is a little better for them." - "Saw Daniel" (M, 43), refugee from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #8, 2/00)

"They do it a lot, and so does the SPDC. Teak. I know that the DKBA sells it at Pa'an and Thaton. They sell it to anyone who will buy it - Burmans, Karens, Indians - many people are buying it. I don't know if they sell it to other countries." - "Saw Po Kyu" (M, xx), Private from #xxx Brigade DKBA, Papun District (Interview #228, 12/99)

"They have 4 aims. To protect nationality, to protect religion, to obey those in authority, and to retain good morals in the populace. But they were doing different things than this. … They are indulging in women. The money that he received he didn't give out for pocket money. During the training he gave me only two hundred Kyat. The other troops received a lot. When he received money or gold, he gave it to women. P— and Bo H— were indulging in women. The women came from Myaing Gyi Ngu." - "Saw K'Thay" (M, 25), Private from #xxx Brigade DKBA, Papun District (Interview #229, 4/00)

"I see that the KNU is working for their nationality, while the DKBA is working for their economic benefit. If they could make money day by day, that was enough. I don't think they have any aims. It is enough for them if they can feed themselves. They do not look out for their nationality. If they have to torture their own nationality, they do it. They are friendly with the civilians from the Myaing Gyi Ngu area. But when they go outside, they do as they want. They tortured some people. I don't see what they are doing for the civilians. I see the DKBA calling themselves 'K'Nyaw Bah Thawka Thu Mu Doh' ['Karen Buddhist Army'] and they are protecting their religion, only Buddhism, not others. I saw the DKBA doing things that were not good. They do enough to get enough for themselves. They don't care about civilians. It's enough for them when they can feed their wives and children. Their families are staying everywhere, some in Myaing Gyi Ngu. The families of DKBA commanders are fed well, but the soldiers are not able to feed their families well." - "Saw Po Kyu" (M, xx), Private from #xxx Brigade DKBA, Papun District (Interview #7, 12/99)

Relations between the DKBA and the SPDC are also on the decline as the usefulness of the DKBA declines. As the SPDC gains more control over the region there is less need for the DKBA and Burmese soldiers are told not to associate with the DKBA. Both villagers and DKBA deserters have told KHRG that they felt the DKBA's time was coming to an end. The DKBA is being supplied less and less by the SPDC, and without those supplies the DKBA will be helpless. There is also little chance of the DKBA reaching a formal agreement with the KNU or rejoining the KNU, as any movement in this direction would be instantly noticed by the SPDC and stopped. DKBA camps are usually near SPDC camps and the soldiers normally operate in joint columns. One villager even claimed that the SPDC had lists of all the DKBA members, which would make it very difficult for there to be a mass defection without putting the families of DKBA members in the villages at risk.

"He [his sergeant] didn't like me to be friendly with the Ko Per Baw [DKBA]. He warned the soldiers about this. He said, 'It is because they are Karen and stay in the mountains. In the past, they were our enemies, but they have come back to work with us, so we can't trust them. That is why. Don't fraternise with the DKBA. If you have relations with them, they will be friendly with you and call you into the jungle. They will take your gun.' They don't like it that we are friendly with the DKBA, however, some soldiers still meet each other secretly." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from SPDC Infantry Battalion #xx, Papun District (Interview #225, 3/00)

"They don't have a good relationship. The Ko Per Baw's time is coming to an end, they are not friendly with the Burmese and some day soon the Burmese Army will wring their necks. The Ko Per Baw say that even though they eat rice from the Burmese, their hearts will never become like the Burmese. But they torture the villagers more than the Burmese do. ...

A: How would they buy it? If the Burmese cut off their rations and their [supply of] weapons, what would they do? They could do nothing. All of their names are written down on a list [by the SPDC]." - "Naw Say Muh" (F, 54), refugee from xxxx village, Dweh Loh township (Interview #203, 7/00)

The KNU and the KNLA

"The job is going well. There are no other problems I have to face. Just the one thing that they [the KNU/KNLA] aren't free anymore so it isn't easy for transportation and we have to face problems. We hope for them [the KNU/KNLA]. If it is possible we would like to ask for help. They have no strength so they can't help us anymore." - "Saw Ko Suh" (M, 54), internally displaced village head from xxxx village, Lu Thaw township (Interview #58, 3/01)

The Karen National Union enjoys much popular support in the hills of Nyaunglebin and Papun Districts and until 1995 controlled much of the Papun hills. Only the southern four village tracts of Day Wah, Kyaw Pa, Meh Prih and Tee Th'Daw Hta in Bu Tho township of Papun District are under full SPDC control. In the rest of the two districts the KNU still maintains a political infrastructure with officials at the village head through district level and departments covering forestry, information, education and other areas of government. KNU officials are active in organising at the village level both in the hills and in the villages under SPDC control. A few schools in the area are also supported by the KNU. Where it can it provides medical and food aid to the internally displaced and occasionally to villages under SPDC control. This amount of aid is small and is in no way enough for every villager. The KNU also arranges for safe places for internally displaced villagers to make their camps and establishes routes for the villagers to get food or even to flee to Thailand. The KNU does place demands on the more stable villages for food, money and porters, although in most areas the villagers are too poor to give anymore. Villagers, while not always happy about giving their money and food to the KNU, generally feel better about it than giving to the SPDC since the demands are not usually accompanied by threats and they view the KNU as fellow Karen. It does place the villagers in a difficult situation because they have no choice but to comply, then after they comply they are accused by the SPDC of supporting the resistance. Villagers who go as porters are also treated much better by the KNU and are usually only taken as far as the next village. The greatest complaint that most villagers have is that the KNU does not come around as much anymore as they used to. Some of the villagers, especially those living in hiding in the hills, feel as though they have been forgotten or are no longer important now that their situation is no longer stable enough to contribute rice or money to the KNU. While not all villagers are happy with the KNU, most do support its goal of autonomy for the Karen people. They are recognised by many villagers as their leaders and are often referred to as such.

This support exists not only in the hills but extends down into the Sittaung River plains as well, despite the strong control the SPDC has exerted there for a long time. Villagers in the SPDC-controlled areas often hide KNU officials or KNLA soldiers who come to their villages, despite SPDC threats of punishment.

"Our leaders are the KNU. The SPDC are not our leaders. … We still have our leaders so they arrange it for us. We haven't dared to go back [to our village] and take our food since we fled. The leaders know we have troubles so they look after us. They have looked after us since the beginning when we fled two or three months ago. We live under their control. If it wasn't like that it would be too hard. They also look after the students for everything. We hope the leaders will help us somewhat, and we will work to get food to eat ourselves somewhat. We have decided to make hill fields here." - "Saw Yo Tha" (M, 56), internally displaced villager from xxxx village, Hsaw Tee township (Interview #101, 3/01)

"Yes, we go and carry for them sometimes when they ask us to carry and send them when they come and go. Sometimes we carry about 4 or 5 viss [6.4-8 kg / 14.4-18 lb] and sometimes it is about 7 or 8 viss [11.2-12.8 kg / 25.2-28.8 lb]. The heaviest is about 10 viss [16 kg / 36 lb]. The people have to do it for them because they ask. … We can eat when we arrive somewhere. We ate together with them. We ate salt and fishpaste. They just mixed salt and chillies and ate like that, so we ate like that also. … They didn't scold us." - "Saw Pleh Wah" (M, 40), internally displaced villager from xxxx village, Hsaw Tee township (Interview #99, 3/01); talking about conditions while portering for the KNU.

"The people who stay outside [KNLA] demanded a goat, and they didn't give money for it. They didn't ask in anger, they asked for it from the village head in a polite way, so people were pleased to give it to them. They stayed in the village for a while and then left the next morning. People were worried that we'd face problems [if the KNLA stayed longer], so we tried to find a goat for them before the Burmese or Ko Per Baw could arrive. ... It is much better when the Kaw Thoo Lei [KNLA] enter the village, because they are Karen like us. If T— [the KNLA commander] asks for food to eat, people want to give it to him. The Ko Per Baw are just the dogs of the Burmese, so they are even worse than the Burmese." - "Naw May Wah" (F, 40+), refugee from xxxx village, Dweh Loh township (Interview #204, 7/00)

Nyaunglebin and Papun Districts are designated as the KNLA 3^rd Brigade and 5^th Brigade areas, respectively, of the Karen National Liberation Army. The KNLA is a guerrilla army and does not have the strength to directly confront the Burmese Army, but it does still operate extensively in both areas conducting guerrilla operations and harassing Army camps. The 3^rd Brigade consists of the 7^th, 8^th and 9^th Battalions as well as militia units. Numbers are hard to confirm but there appear to be several hundred KNLA soldiers. 5^th Brigade has one battalion, the 102^nd Battalion, which also has several hundred soldiers. These battalions are supported by local part-time guerrilla soldiers who often act as guards for the hiding places of internally displaced villagers and villages still under KNU control. The KNLA no longer controls fixed territory in the area, but they do hold de facto control of large areas in the hills; SPDC troops do not dare enter these areas except in large columns, and when they do the KNLA and the villagers clear out of the way until they are gone. KNLA units in the 3^rd Brigade regularly go down into the plains to carry out hit and run raids and to ask for food. How successful they are can be seen in that a new road has been built from Na Than Gwin to Mone; the old road ran along the base of the hills and the Sa Thon Lon were afraid to travel along it because they knew they were KNLA targets. Ironically, many of the villagers forced to build the new road had been forced out of the area of the old road, making it uninhabited and easier for the KNLA to operate in. KNLA ambushes and raids also still occur in areas of Papun District which the SPDC has declared as 'white' or free from resistance activity. Trucks going to and from Papun are ambushed or hit by landmines on the Ka Ma Maung-Papun car road, and SPDC camps are occasionally attacked. When the KNLA still held stationary positions and controlled territory before 1995, many of its soldiers were conscripted, but since that time it has become a much smaller guerrilla force and no longer practices conscription, though there are still many child soldiers among its ranks. The morale of the KNLA soldiers is generally high and their weapons are well maintained, however the weapons are old and ammunition is in scarce supply. To make up for their great numerical disadvantage and their lack of ammunition, the KNLA manufactures its own basic landmines and uses them extensively to protect their supply lines and to restrict the movement of SPDC units. Landmines are also used to protect hidden sites of displaced villagers and escape routes for refugees. The KNLA notifies villagers of roughly where the landmines are, but many villagers are still wounded and killed by KNLA mines (see the 'Landmines' section below). When they can, KNLA soldiers warn villagers of approaching SPDC columns and the villagers pass intelligence on SPDC activities in return. The KNLA sometimes ambushes these columns to allow the villagers time to escape. Often upon hearing of an approaching column, the KNLA and the villagers simply move out of its way, coming back after the column has passed through. Some displaced villagers on the run follow along with KNLA units for a small measure of protection.

"The resistance people who stay around there. They try to provide security, and we tell each other things. They try to protect us, but when the Burmese come there are 70 or 80 of them [so the KNLA doesn't take them on]." - "Saw Lay Pa" (M, 39), refugee from xxxx village, Kyauk Kyi township (Interview #66, 1/00)

"They are travelling around there. They shoot the Burmese sometimes. The Burmese last came three years ago and at that time the people [KNLA] shot them. When they came recently, the people also shot them." - "Saw Ghay Hser" (M, 26), KHRG field researcher from Nyaunglebin District (Interview #1, 2/01)

"They are active and go down to the plains and shoot [the DKBA and SPDC soldiers]. If they meet the soldiers they shoot and if they don't meet them they arrange for rice from the plains area. They go to get rice from the plains. They go to buy it." - "Saw Lin Yone" (M, 32), KHRG field researcher from Nyaunglebin District (Interview #2, 2/01)

"The soldiers from the KNLA do not come. Only one or a few soldiers come at a time. If they see their enemies they fight, but they don't harm the villagers, beat or hit the villagers. They don't force us but we do as they say." - "Saw Ber Kaw" (M, 40), village head from xxxx village, Mone township (Interview #17, 4/01)

II. The Military Situation

The SPDC

The Sa Thon Lon

The DKBA

The KNU and the KNLA